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Abstract—Body Sensor Networks can be used to continuously
monitor patients’ health. However, secure association of sensors
with the patient and key management for providing integrity and
confidentiality to the sensor readings is essential. We propose
a secure discovery protocol based on the synchronised LED
blinking pattern, to enable healthcare workers to authorise
the sensor-to-patient association. We also propose a novel key
distribution and management scheme that uses keychains to
establish group keys for body sensor networks and caters for
group key update and re-keying to adapt to membership changes.
These protocols have been implemented to demonstrate their
feasibility and initial performance evaluation is presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Body Sensor Networks (BSNs) with portable
devices such as smart phones enable continuous efficient
monitoring and management of post-operative and chronically-
ill patients to enable early release from hospital. Healthcare
personnel can be automatically alerted if the patient’s condi-
tion deteriorates. BSNs must ensure confidentiality, integrity
and availability of the physiological data, as wireless sensor
networks are susceptible to passive eavesdropping, packet
injection, and vulnerable to many other security attacks. Fur-
thermore, the design of the security protocols must carefully
balance satisfying the security requirements with limiting the
power and computational requirements. To securely establish
BSNs we must first ensure that only designated sensors are
associated with the patient and only by an authorised party.
For example, a nurse is permitted to attach a specific approved
ECG sensor to monitor the heart-rate of a post-operative
patient while arbitrary nearby ECG sensors on other patients
must not be associated.
The second security goal is to preserve the confidentiality
and integrity of the medical data, which is susceptible to
eavesdropping when transmitted wirelessly. Sensor readings
must therefore be encrypted and given the sensors’ limited
capabilities, the use of a shared group key is desirable. A
lightweight key management scheme is needed to use less
computationally intensive cryptographic operations and reduce
power consumption by minimising messages exchanges.
Thirdly, managing group membership is required to facil-
itate addition and removal of sensors from the BSN, and
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renewing the group key when necessary. Existing sensors may
fail permanently or temporarily become disconnected from the
BSN whereas new sensors may be added according to medical
needs. There is a need to distinguish between temporary and
permanent disconnection, to establish persistent pairings that
survive transient disconnection and to renew the group key
when a sensor is permanently detached. We propose a novel
secure sensor discovery protocol that integrates the BLIG [1]
sensor association scheme, with an efficient key distribution
and key management scheme using a keychain to establish a
shared secret group key.
The paper is organised as follows: Section II discusses
related work and its limitations. Section III discusses the
threat model. Section IV, describes sensor discovery and
association, while Section V describes the key distribution and
management. We present the prototype implementation and
results in Section VI and discuss trade-offs in Section VII.
Conclusions and future work are presented in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
BLIG [1] uses synchronised blinking of LEDs enabling
a healthcare worker to visually verify the correct grouping
of sensors on a patient. It uses short range communication,
(i.e., < 0.5m), to discover new sensors, establish the patient’s
identity and map between the patient’s true id and the sensor
group. We have enhanced BLIG for more robust sensor
discovery and association as well as sensor authentication and
key management for BSNs.
Pre-shared symmetric key protocols are used in large scale
sensor networks for environmental monitoring [2], [3]. A key-
share is loaded in each node and used to derive a common
secret key. In a hospital setting, this is not sufficient as
groups overlap in their wireless range and only the correct
sensors must be associated with the patient. Additionally, these
protocols require intensive computation to replace the group
key when membership changes.
Balfanz [4] uses a secure-limited channel, e.g., infrared to
exchange public-keys between parties in a pre-authentication
phase before authentication. However, this requires dedicated
hardware and/or hosting the pre-authentication phase in a
confined area, which would be difficult in a hospital ward.
Human confirmation of correct association is also difficult
when based on public-keys and without visual cues.
The resurrecting duckling protocol [5], [6] establishes a
master-slave relationship between devices where the first de-
vice in contact with a sensor becomes its master and can
upload policies to the sensor that permit interactions with other
devices. Sensors from previous patients have to be explicitly
dis-associated by the master before reuse by other patients
which may not always be practical in hospitals.
Jiang [7] uses self-certified keys (SCK) and Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) to establish pair-wise keys for authenti-
cation. Each sensor establishes a secret with the user based on
the secret information pre-loaded by a key distribution centre
(KDC). Authentication is achieved if the user demonstrates
knowledge of the shared secret-key with at least t sensors.
To achieve sensor to patient association each patient’s BSN
would require different ECC curve parameters (as each BSN
is a domain)which would be impractical for hundreds of BSNs
in a hospital. SNAP [8] also uses ECC to establish pair-wise
keys between sensors and the base station. It requires each
sensor to be equipped with a biometric device to authenticate
the patient and uses the shared secret to communicate with
the base station. However, it does not establish a group
keys. Other studies have shown that ECC-based public-key
cryptography [9], [10], [11], is viable for resource constrained
wireless sensor networks to provide better key distribution,
management and authentication.
III. THREAT MODEL
It is not easy to confine short range wireless interactions
in hospital wards. Data confidentiality may be compromised
through eavesdropping. Data integrity may be compromised by
injecting data into the wireless channel or simply interfering
with the wireless transmission. Sensors may be associated
with the wrong patient either mistakenly or maliciously (e.g.,
through impersonation). Medical data is confidential and
would interest many attackers including employers, insurance
companies, personal enemies and unscrupulous media for
newsworthy persons.
Passive Eavesdropping. Wireless channels are susceptible
to passive eavesdropping and message interception. Whilst
traffic can be encrypted, sensor data is vulnerable to cryptanal-
ysis as measurements fall within known ranges, and chosen
ciphertext attacks become possible. Therefore, the encryption
key must be regularly renewed and used for short time periods.
Active Attacks. Active attacks include injecting messages
into the wireless channel, replaying or altering messages.
Spurious messages injected into the network, e.g., sending
false sensor readings will disrupt the accuracy of the mea-
surements. Message replays or modification of messages, to
cause a medication overdose, pose a serious risk to the patient.
Thus, authentication, authorisation and message freshness are
necessary to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the
transmitted data.
Impersonation and Masquerading. Impersonation would
typically occur when an attacker in the guise of a sensor joins
or claims to be part of a patient’s BSN to eavesdrop on data
and/or report false data. Authentication is essential to prove
the sensor’s membership in the BSN
Denial of Service Attack. Our work does not address
Physical Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks by frequency jam-
ming [12]. We are solely concerned with detecting malicious
sensors that repeatedly attempt to join a BSN, thus aiming to
deplete resources and prevent genuine sensors from joining.
IV. SECURE SENSOR ASSOCIATION
Post-operative patients typically need continuous monitor-
ing whilst in hospital or at home e.g. ECG sensors monitor
heart condition, SpO2 sensors monitor oxygen saturation, and
other sensors observe blood pressure and body temperature. A
device such PDA or mobile phone is often used as a controller
to co-ordinate communication and manage the sensors in the
BSN. When attaching a new sensor, the healthcare worker
switches on the sensor, enabling discovery by the controller.
However, nearby sensors will also be discovered and solely
based on sensor type and credentials, the BSN controller can-
not decide if the sensor should be associated with its patient.
An explicit action is thus required to identify the correct
association. Instead of using short-range confined communi-
cation or physical contact to distinguish the sensor, we use the
BLIG approach [1] where sensor and controller synchronise
their LED blinking in an agreed pattern. This provides an
authorised healthcare worker with the visual representation
of the association, that she can then explicitly authorise. The
discovery protocol also establishes a pairwise key between
each sensor admitted to the BSN and the patient controller
device, used to distribute the group key. The next section
presents our assumptions and introduces the cryptographic
notation whilst the protocol is described in Section IV-B.
A. Assumptions and Notation
We consider the hospital as the root Certification Authority
(CA) issuing attribute certificates to its staff, patients, devices
and sensors certifying their roles and attributes. Appropriate
certificates and private keys are pre-loaded into devices and
sensors before release for use to enable attribute-based au-
thentication.
Sensors attached to the patient are discovered sequentially,
by the patient’s controller and a complete iteration of the
protocol is necessary for each sensor. Otherwise, an attacker
sensor could ”lie” and copy the neighbour’s blinking at the
same time as the neighbour is being associated.
Medical sensors are trusted to generate good pseudo ran-
dom numbers usingaccelerometers or input from other noisy
sensors to determine a seed for the generator.
Authenticated healthcare workers and patients i.e. who
present valid attribute certificates issued by the hospital are
assumed well-behaved. The protocols do not attempt to deal
with malicious insiders. More specifically, healthcare workers
are trusted to correctly authorise sensor-to-patient associations,




BSN, e.g., launching man-in-the middle attacks. Further, sen-
sors that have become detached from the BSN, are trusted to
Patient (P) Sensor (S) HealthWorker (H)
(1) {Kp, patient}K−1ca , mp1={Pid,Np}, Sign{mp1}K−1p! !
(2) {Kh, nurse}K−1ca , mh1={Pid,H,Np + 1, Nh}, Sign{mh1}K−1hﬀ
(3) {Join, Sid,Np + 1, Ns, P id,Kps, gy}Kpﬀ
(4) {ACK,P id, Sid,Ns + 1, pattern, gx}Kps !
Both devices perform synchronised LED blinking
(5) mh2={AUTH,P id,Np + 2, Nh}, Sign{mh2}K−1hﬀ
(6) mp2={ACK,Nh + 1, P id, Sid, {Ns + 2, P id, Sid}Kps}, Sign{mp2}K−1p !
(7) mh3={AUTH,P id, {Ns + 2, P id, Sid}Kps}, Sign{mh3}K−1hﬀ
Fig. 1. The secure discovery protocol.
detect this and wipe state information such as encryption keys
and received messages from their RAM. The notation used in
our protocols is given in Table I
TABLE I
NOTATION USED
H Healthcare worker’s device
P Patient’s device
S Wireless medical sensor
CA Root Certification Authority Hospital
Kx, K−1x Public and private key of x
{Kx, att}K−1y Attribute certificate bound to Kx, signed by K
−1
y
{m}Kx Encryption of m using public-key of x{m}Kab Encryption of m using secret key KabSign{m}
K−1x
Signing hash of m using private-key of x
Nx Nonce of x
P id Unique identifier of BSN
Sid Unique identifier of Sensor
B. Secure Discovery Protocol
Figure 1 summarises the secure discovery protocol using
a sequence diagram. Broadly the protocol is divided in three
phases: mutual authentication, information exchange and sen-
sor association.
1) Mutual Authentication Phase: The patient’s controller
and the healthcare worker’s device mutually authenticate each
other to establish a session context in which the healthcare
worker becomes the sole entity permitted to associate sensors
to the patient’s controller. The patient’s controller periodically
broadcasts message (Msg 1) to discover sensors and devices
nearby. Msg 1 consists of a certificate binding the attribute
‘patient’ to the patient’s public-key, {Kp, patient}K−1ca as wellas a signed message mp1 containing the BSN id, Pid and a
nonce Np. This enables the healthcare worker to verify the
signature and the attribute (role) of the patient’s controller.
The healthcare worker then authenticates itself to the patient’s
controller by sending Msg 2 which consists of the healthcare
worker’s attribute certificate, {Kh, nurse}K−1ca and a signedmessage mh1 . In mh1 , the nonce Np+1 guarantees message
freshness and Nh+1 is used to detect replay of Msg 2. Note
that, the healthcare worker could also authenticate itself to the
sensor, but this is not necessary as no interaction between them




thenticate the healthcare worker when the association between
the sensor and the patient’s device (Msg 7), is authorised.
2) Information Exchange Phase: The sensor and the pa-
tient’s device perform a DH key exchange of their respective
keyshares. The LED blinking pattern is sent to the sensor
encrypted with a symmetric key. Msg 1 enables the sensor
to verify the patient’s attribute certificate and public-key, K p.
The sensor then sends a join request (Msg 3) encrypted with
the patient’s public-key to the patient. Msg 3 contains Ns that
guarantees freshness of the message, and Sid as the sensor’s
ID. The sensor also generates a secret key Kps and a Diffie-
Hellman (DH) keyshare gy . The patient’s controller decrypts
the receive join request using the private key and retrieves
the secret-key and the sensor’s DH keyshare. Instead of using
public-key encryption, the patient uses the secret-key, K ps to
encrypt a blinking pattern together with its DH keyshare g x
and sends them back to the sensor in Msg 4. We rely on the
sensor to generate a secret key Kps instead of the patient’s
device to reduce message exchanges. Furthermore, only the
sensor needs to authenticate the patient, but not vice versa as
we rely on the healthcare worker to pair the correct devices
together. As shown in Figure 2, if the patient’s device generates
Kps, the sensor must convey its public-key to the patient
before it can encrypt Kps. This would require four messages
instead of the original three; the number of cryptographic
operations also increases as the sensor needs to generate and
verify signatures in Msg 1, 2, 3 as well as decrypting Msg 3
using public-key cryptography before the secret key, K ps is
first used.
3) Sensor Association Phase: Only the patient’s device and
the sensor know the chosen blinking pattern to display for
a specified period of time. After observing the synchonised
blinking, the healthcare worker authorises the association by
Patient (P) Sensor (S)
(1) Sign{mp1}K−1p !







Fig. 2. Requiring the patient’s device to generate Kps incurs additional
costs.
an AUTH message (Msg 5) to the patient’s device, which
acknowledges it in Msg 6. Np+2 and Nh in Msg 5 guarantee
the freshness of the authorisation message. The healthcare
worker’s device needs the sensorID for the AUTH message
so the ACK message (Msg 6) from the patient contains Sid,
as well as a commitment encrypted with Kps that only the
sensor can decrypt and containing Ns+2 to prevent replay.
Msg 7 is an AUTH message sent by the healthcare worker
to the sensor confirming its association with the patient. The
sensor can decrypt the commitment and verify freshness Msg
7 by checking Ns+2. With both the sensor’s and the patient’s
Diffie-Hellman keyshares exchanged, they derive g xy as their
secret key. Kps would have been sufficient for the purpose
of this paper, and the DH key exchange could have been
removed. However, the DH secret key allows future extensions
to cater for direct sensor-to-sensor authentication. In [13] we
have proved that both the sensor and the patient’s controller
believe the secret-key they have derived, using BAN logic.
V. KEY MANAGEMENT
Communication between the sensor and the patient’s device
can be encrypted using the DH secret key. However, no keys
are shared between sensor pairs and routing all communication
via the controller device would be inefficient. Moreover, med-
ical events and network changes would typically be conveyed
to all devices in the BSN network. Point-to-point notifications
have redundancy and overhead as the same message must
be encrypted n times and then sent to n parties. Encrypted
broadcast provides an effective scheme for constrained envi-
ronments that consist of mostly sensors with scarce resources.
A shared group key, G can be established to enable all parties
in the BSN to communicate with each other directly. This
is based on the assumption that only authenticated, hospital
approved sensors have been included in the BSN, so they
are well behaved and do not impersonate other sensors in the
same BSN. The key distribution and management scheme we
propose does not rely on public-key cryptography to distribute
initial keying materials, but uses symmetric-key cryptography
and computation of hashes to significantly reduce computation
on sensors.
Two one-way hash chains are used to generate shared group
keys in which a key from each hash chain is concatenated and
then hashed to produce the group key. The group key can
be renewed by advancing both keychains forward to obtain
the previous key from the corresponding hash chain. The next
group key is then generated by hashing the concatenated keys
from the chains. This scheme provides forward secrecy as it
does not reveal any information about the hash chains and
their keys for generating the group key if the group key is
compromised.
A. Establishing a Group Key, Gi
The patient’s controller in the BSN is responsible for the
key distribution and management as it typically has higher
computational capability and already shares a DH secret key
with each sensor. It generates two key chains [14] each
consisting of n keys using a one-way hash function, e.g., SHA-
1 using a random number, generated as the initial key and the
hash function is applied to the key to generate the next key.
The next key is hashed repeatedly for n− 1 times to produce
the keychain. The first k chain contains keys K1, K2,..., Kn
and the second x chain contains X1, X2,..., Xn.
k chain
K1 → K2=H[K1] → ... → Kn=H[Kn−1]
x chain








Gn−1, Gn−2, ... , G2,
Fig. 3. Generating group keys.
As shown in Figure 3, both keychains are used in reverse
order when Kn and Xn are disseminated, encrypted using
the secret-key gxy, shared between the patient’s device and
the sensor. On receipt, the sensor computes the hash of Kn
and Xn concatenated as a group secret key, Gi. This key can
be changed whenever a new sensor or device is added, but it
must be renewed when an existing sensor is removed from the
BSN or when the group key has been used for an extended
period of time (c.f. Section V-B). Our key management scheme
provides forward secrecy as there is no dependency between
G1, G2, ..., and Gn. Compromising any of them does not
reveal information about keys on k and x chains, so attackers
cannot compute the keys to decrypt the data.
B. Re-Keying or Key Update
When a new sensor is discovered, the patient’s device
conveys the current Ki and Xi, encrypted with the shared
secret-key, gxy to enables the new sensor to compute the
current group key, Gi.
When a sensor leaves the BSN, the group key must be
renewed. The patient’s device advances the keychains to obtain
Ki−1 and Xi−1 from their respective chain. As shown in
Figure 4, both keys are encrypted with the current X i and
then broadcast to all sensors/devices in a key update message.
Upon receipt, the sensors compute H[K i−1] and H[Xi−1] and
ensure that the hash values match the current K i and Xi
respectively. This authenticates the source and contents of the
key update message as only the patient’s controller knows the
keychains. The sensors then derive the new group key, G i−1
using H’[(Ki−1 || Xi−1)].
..., Ki−1, Ki, ...
..., Xi−1, Xi, ...
{Ki−1, Xi−1}Xi ! H[(Ki−1 || Xi−1)]
Sensors compute
as the new group key
#
$
Fig. 4. Renewing the group key.
If a sensor is detected to have been compromised, a new
group key must be derived. The patient’s controller broadcasts
the following:
{s1, {Ki−1, Xi−1, Np}gax}, {s2, {Ki−1, Xi−1, Np}gbx},...,{sn, {Ki−1, Xi−1, Np}gnx}
The compromised sensor’s key is not used so it will not be
able to obtain Ki−1 and Xi−1, but other sensors can use their
respective secret-key to decrypt the message and compute the
new group key. Np is used to detect replay of the message.
Detection that a node is compromised, is very difficult –
usually based on anomalous behavior and is not covered in
this paper.
When all keys in the keychains have been used up, the
patient’s device generates two new keychains and similarly
conveys the first key of both keychains (Kn and Xn) to
all sensors encrypted with each individual sensor’s secret-key
to ensure that Kn and Xn are from the patient’s device as
encrypting them with the group key does not prove source au-
thenticity. Unlike TESLA [15], [16] which uses keychains for
authenticated broadcast, we use keychains to generate group
keys for encryption. This has the advantage of efficient and
effective authentication of the source of key update messages
when re-keying or distributing key updates without relying on
public-key cryptography.
C. Managing Sensor’s Intermittent Connectivity
Transient failures occur if a sensor temporarily moves out
of communication range and leaves the BSN for a short
period. When rejoining the BSN they must still be able to
communicate with other devices in the BSN so they have to
obtain the latest Ki and Xi if they have missed the key update
messages. We have devised a simple protocol to rejoin a BSN
by requiring the patient’s device to maintain the DH secret-
key with the sensor for an extended period of time after the
sensor has left. As shown in Figure 5, the group key could
have been renewed multiple times if the BSN’s membership
changes after the sensor has left, so it will not have received
any key updates from the patient’s device to renew its group
key. When it rejoins, it proves membership using its secret-key,
gxy. It sends a challenge containing its Sid and a nonce Ns
encrypted with gxy to the patient’s device, which responds
by encrypting the current Ki and Xi together with Ns + 1
using gxy. The sensor can authenticate the message as it only
shares the secret-key with the patient’s device. This scheme




Sensor moves out of range
Missed a few Key Update Messages
Back in range
Challenge: Sid, {Sid,Ns}gxy !
Response: Sid, {Sid,Ns + 1,Ki, Xi}gxyﬀ
Fig. 5. A temporarily disconnected sensor regains its membership in BSN.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
A. Elliptic Curve Cryptography Parameters
Both the secure discovery and key management protocols
have been implemented on Tmote Sky1 using the elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) library, TinyECC version 0.3 [9]. We use
the recommended 160-bit Elliptic Curve domain parameters
over Fp associated with a verifiably random parameters, i.e.,
secp160r1. A wide range of parameters can be selected
from [17] and a base point G is chosen.
B. ElGamal Implementation
The public key encryption used to encrypt Msg 3 in the
secure discovery protocol is implemented using the ElGamal
scheme [18]. The plaintext message is first embedded onto
the elliptic curve E as a point, Pm. The sender then chooses
a random bit pattern, r and computes two points, Pr = rG
where G is the base point, and Ph = Pm + rPB where PB is
the public key of the receiver.
The sensor sends both points, Pr and Ph to the patient
device, which extracts the message point by computing P s
= kBPr where kB is the private key of the receiver. It then
substracts this from Ph to get Pm = Ph - Ps. By expanding
this equation, we show that Pm can be recovered as follows:
Pm = Ph - Ps
since Ph = Pm + r(kBG) where rPB = r(kBG)
we derive that Pm = Pm + r(kBG) - kB(rG)
Based on the BigInteger library in TinyECC, we have im-
plemented ElGamal public key encryption for TinyOS version
1.0x.
C. Diffie-Hellman Implementation
The ECC Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement requires the
two parties to first compute a public point by choosing a
random bit pattern ki as the private key share and multipling
it with the base point, G which is public, i.e., Pi = kiG.
This public point is then exchanged between two parties and
the shared DH key can be computed by multiplying their
respective private key ki with the received public point, i.e.,
1Runs TinyOS and has 16-bit, 8 MHz Texas Instruments MSP430 processor
with 48 KB of ROM and 10 KB of RAM
Pab = kA(kBG) = kB(kAG). Although a point on an elliptic
curve is represented by (x, y), only the x value is used as the
shared secret. x value is hashed to produce a 160-bit key for
encryption. Using TinyECC, the DH key exchange protocol
has been implemented using simple scalar point multiplication.
D. Skipjack Symmetric Key Encryption
We initially considered using Tmote Sky’s on-chip Ad-
vance Encryption Standard (AES) library for symmetric-key
encryption of data transfers. However, it only performs stand-
alone encryption and does not support stand-alone decryption,
presumably as the manufacturer assumed that all the data from
the motes will be sent to a sink node. Although it supports
inline AES encryption at the MAC layer, this is not suitable as
we require application layer to be able to select a specific key
based on the destination and software AES implementation
on the mote results in unsatisfactory performance [19]. Con-
sequently, we modified the MicaZ specific Skipjack algorithm
implemented in TinySec [19] for Tmote Sky. All messages are
encrypted using the Skipjack algorithm with a a symmetric
key. The hash function SHA-1 produces 160-bit output which
fits nicely into the key size of Skipjack. We used the Skipjack
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with a block size of 8
bytes and non-repeating Initialisation Vector (IV). The battery
level, or accelerometer reading of the mote has been used
as the seed to generate the initial IV to produce different
ciphertext from the same plaintext.
E. Measurements and Evaluation
Table II shows the execution time of various security oper-
ations on Tmote Sky. ElGamal takes 9.53s (variance is 0.167)
to encrypt a 52 bytes message, while decryption takes 5.28s
(variance is 0.00004), as the sender needs to compute two
points, Pr = rG and rPB . Note that, according to [9], digital
signature generation and verification take 4.361s and 5.448s
respectively on TelosB which has the same design as same
design as Tmote Sky. These results are much slower compared
to MicaZ’s implementation because hybrid multiplication has
not been implemented on TelosB/Tmote Sky in TinyECC
version 0.3. Symmetric-key encryption using Skipjack, is
significantly faster than public-key encryption for the same
plaintext length. Encryption takes 150µs and decryption takes
90µs. Consequently, the secure discovery protocol tries to
minimise the use of signature generation/verification, as well
as public-key encryption/decryption by using a symmetric
secret-key to convey the blinking pattern to the sensor. The key
management scheme also uses Skipjack for key distribution,
key renewal and key updates.
Table III shows the codesize of security components. SHA-1
uses 2,442 bytes [9] for TelosB. The wireless communication,
LEDs indication and basic standard library uses 16.43 Kb
of ROM and 0.57 Kb of RAM with an overall codesize of
36.20 Kb (ROM) and 3.56 Kb (RAM) for the secure discovery
protocol and key management. This could be further optimised
by using TinyECC version 1.0 [20] which implements Barret
TABLE II
LATENCY FOR VARIOUS SECURITY OPERATIONS ON TMOTE SKY
Security Operations Time
Public-key Encryption 9.53 s
Public-key Decryption 5.28 s
Signature Generation 4.26 s
Signature Verification 5.45 s
Diffie-Hellman Key Generation 5.97 s
Skipjack Encryption 150 µs
Skipjack Decryption 90 µs
reduction, repeated point doubling and affine coordinate point
addition and doubling.
TABLE III
CODESIZE FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS ON TMOTE SKY
Security Operations ROM RAM
Elgamal public-key encryption 10.42 Kb 1.54 Kb
Diffie-Hellman 6.92 Kb 1.12 Kb
Skipjack 4.41 KB 0.45 Kb
VII. DISCUSSION
In contrast to wireless sensor networks for environmental
monitoring where sensors relay data to a sink node, BSNs for
healthcare usually have a patient controller that manages its
sensors in terms of configuration changes, i.e., modifying mon-
itoring thresholds, managing addition and removal of sensors
and actuators. Delegating the computational intensive security
functions to the patient’s controller can prolong battery life
on sensors and support better security mechanisms such as
signature generation and verification. However, this results in
a single point of failure and hence it is important to ensure
that the patient protects the device from malicious tampering
and theft. In case of theft, the patient can manually turn off
the sensors attached to his BSN to avoid information leakage.
Human intervention is needed to replace a failed battery
and restart the sensor, but results in loss of the state infor-
mation regarding which patient the sensor is associated with.
Consequently, we advocate that upon discovery, the sensor
stores the patient’s public-key in its flash and when restarted, it
authenticates and re-associates with the patient device without
requiring a healthcare worker’s intervention. The patient’s
device must keep a record of the sensor’s information, e.g., the
DH shared secret-key or the sensor’s public-key to facilitate
re-association. The sensor can be explicitly disassociated by
erasing the public-key from the flash through a management
action by the healthcare worker.
The use of a shared group key has a drawback in that it
does not distinguish the sender of a message from other group
members. Hence, it does not guarantee non-repudiation and
implies that anyone in possession of the group key can modify
the message content. As a result, the group key is purely used
for ensuring message confidentiality and integrity in BSNs.
Information sources which need to be authenticated can sign
messages using the DH shared secret-key.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented an approach to securely discover sensors
and associate them to the patient’s controller to join the
patient’s BSN. The design takes account of the limitations
of mobile devices/sensors – lack of screen display and con-
strained computational capability. Our approach to discovering
sensors enables the devices to exchange security information
such as public-keys, symmetric key and DH keyshares. More
importantly, we provide a practical scheme of associating
sensors to the patient’s device which can only be done by
an authorised healthcare worker.
We presented a novel key distribution and management
scheme based on a keychain which only uses hash functions
and symmetric-key encryption and does not rely on public-
key cryptography, so is very efficient with low computational
overheads. Distribution of group keys is simplified and key
update messages can be authenticated easily because of the
one-way property of the secure hash function. This facilitates
efficient renewal of group keys to cater for membership
changes.
The future work includes investigating the possibility of
providing access control for the BSN to control interactions
between individual sensors, e.g., invoking actions and sending
event notifications directly to each other. This will require
extension to the current key management scheme to enable
sensors to authenticate each other and enforce access control
policies.
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